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“Commend me the Yak”:
The Colombo Plan, the Inuit of Ungava, 
and ‘Developing’ Canada’s North
DAVID MEREN*
This article engages with the entangled histories of Canadian foreign aid and 
relations between Indigenous peoples and Canada. Specifically, it traces a proposal 
in the early 1950s to use the Colombo Plan, the Commonwealth development 
program in which Canada was a participant, to transfer yaks from India for 
use in the “development” of the Inuit population in northern Quebec. While the 
relocation was ultimately never realized, the episode reveals how questions of 
race and empire, not least the environmental dimension of these, along with the 
priority accorded to promoting a liberal-capitalist version of “modernization,” 
informed the imaginary underpinning the Canadian state’s engagement with 
Indigenous populations and the Global South. More broadly, the subject matter 
highlights how the history of Indigenous-settler encounters informed Canadian 
attitudes regarding development assistance, and vice versa. 
Le présent article aborde l’histoire enchevêtrée de l’aide canadienne internationale 
et des relations du Canada avec ses peuples autochtones. Il retrace en particulier 
la proposition formulée au début des années 1950 d’utiliser le « plan Colombo », 
programme de développement du Commonwealth auquel participait le Canada, 
pour importer d’Inde des yacks destinés à servir au « développement » des 
populations inuit du Nord du Québec. Bien que cette idée ne se soit finalement 
jamais concrétisée, cet épisode révèle la façon dont les questions de race et 
d’empire, y compris dans leurs dimensions environnementales, ainsi que la priorité 
donnée à l’avancement d’une version libérale-capitaliste de la « modernisation », 
ont façonné l’imaginaire qui sous-tend l’engagement de l’État canadien envers 
les populations autochtones et les pays de l’hémisphère sud. Plus largement, ce 
sujet éclaire la façon dont les rencontres entre Autochtones et colons ont influencé 
la position du Canada vis-à-vis de l’aide au développement, et vice versa. 
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As a friend to the children, commend me the Yak
You will find it exactly the thing.
It can carry and fetch, you can ride on its back
Or lead it about with a string.
The Tartar who lives in the plains of Tibet, 
A desolate region of snow,
Has for centuries made it a nursery pet, 
And surely the Tartar must know.
So ask your Papa where the Yak may be got, 
And if he is awfully rich,
He will buy you the creature, or else he will not,
I cannot be positive which.
Hillaire Belloc, “The Yak” (1896)
AS 1953 DREW to a close, ambitious plans were afoot in Ottawa. With 
development assistance having emerged as a global phenomenon, officials 
in the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (DNANR) had 
grand visions of importing yaks from India to transform the lives of Inuit living 
in Quebec’s Ungava region (Nunavik). Senior officials hoped to harness the 
Commonwealth Programme for Economic Assistance to South and Southeast 
Asia created three years prior—the Colombo Plan—to realize the scheme. 
Notions of developmental reciprocity informed bureaucratic discussions: Third 
World recipients of Canadian aid were to help Canada’s Indigenous peoples, all 
under Ottawa’s benevolent gaze. Engaging in some playful humour, Marjorie C. 
Findlay, a doctoral researcher involved in the project, sent Hillaire Belloc’s “The 
Yak” as a New Year’s greeting to her DNANR contacts. W.T. Larmour, of the 
department’s Arctic Services branch, was not amused. Findlay’s “levity” was “not 
helpful”; mindful of public opinion, Larmour felt Findlay “ought to be reminded” 
that if staff members engaged in ridicule “they can hardly expect … support where 
it will be most needed.”1
The attempt to see yaks imported from India to Ungava can certainly appear 
ridiculous, and at times turned downright farcical. Yet the ultimately fruitless 
effort was significant. Beyond being indicative of an advancing colonialism, as a 
settler society targeted Indigenous peoples and their lands,2 the episode points to 
1 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 85, Northern Affairs Program (NAP), 93/251-3-7/1, Memorandum 
from Larmour for Cantley, Stevenson, Houston, Johnson, Jan. 7, 1954 (attached letter from Findlay). 
2 For the theoretical literatures on ‘colonialism,’ ‘settler colonialism,’ and ‘internal colonization’ regarding 
Canadian actions in the Arctic, see Joan Sangster, The Iconic North: Cultural Constructions of Aboriginal 
Life in Postwar Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), pp. 11-16. Also, Peter Kulchyski and Frank James 
Tester, Kiumajut (Talking Back), Game Management and Inuit Rights, 1900-70 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2007), p. 276. They speak of a “particular colonialism.” Especially pertinent because of the environmental 
dimension is Liza Piper and John Sandlos, “A Broken Frontier: Ecological Imperialism in the Canadian 
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the entanglement of Canadian aid and Indian policy in the decades following the 
Second World War.3 Canada, a country founded upon a logic of empire and white 
supremacy, had emerged from the war as a global industrial power and sought to 
bestow the blessings of ‘technical assistance’ on ‘under-developed’ populations 
abroad and at home. Although Canada’s technical assistance efforts fit into a much 
longer history of imperialism and settler colonialism, they also highlight evolving 
attitudes and an enduring Euro-Canadian racial paternalism regarding the Global 
South and those relegated to the bottom of Canada’s racial pyramid. 
Notwithstanding the extensive literature on Canadian international history, 
development assistance has until recently suffered from relative neglect, a trend 
consistent with the field’s marginalizing of the Global South.4 This lacuna is all 
the more glaring in contrast to the dynamic interrogations of Indigenous-settler 
relations in Canada.5 Postcolonial studies have made a contribution to this 
efflorescence, apparent in efforts to put Indigenous history into conversation with 
various aspects of Canadian history, ranging from citizenship and immigration, 
through the history of medicine, to Arctic militarization.6 Building on these 
historiographical trends, this article explores the points of convergence between 
North,” Environmental History vol. 12 (Oct. 2007), pp. 759-795.
3 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire croisée and the Challenge 
of Reflexivity,” History and Theory, vol. 45 (2006), pp. 30-50; Jürgen Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond,” 
History & Theory, vol. 42, no. 1 (2003), pp. 39-44.
4 Only two monographs exist in English: David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and 
Canadian Development Assistance (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press in association with the 
North-South Institute/L’Institut Nord-Sud, 1998), and Bruce Muirhead and Ronald N. Harpelle, IDRC: 40 
Years of Ideas, Innovation, and Impact (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010). Growing 
interest in Canadian relations with the Global South is adding rapidly to this historiography: Tamara Myers, 
“Local Action and Global Imagining: Youth, International Development, and the Walkathon Phenomenon 
in Sixties’ and Seventies’ Canada,” Diplomatic History, vol. 38, no. 2 (2014), p. 282-293; Ruth Compton 
Brouwer, Canada’s Global Villagers: CUSO in Development, 1961-86 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013); 
David Webster, Fire and the Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2009). Broader studies of Canadian encounters with the Global South, as well as the question of race 
in Canadian international history, can be found in Karen Dubinsky, Sean Mills, and Scott Rutherford, eds., 
Canada and the Third World, Overlapping Histories (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), and 
Laura Madokoro, Francine McKenzie, and David Meren, eds., Dominion of Race: Rethinking Canada’s 
International History (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017).
5 Allan Downey, The Creator’s Game, Lacrosse, Identity and Indigenous Nationhood (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2018); Emilie Cameron, Far Off Metal River, Inuit Lands, Settler Stories, and the Making of the 
Contemporary Arctic (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015); Mary Jane Logan McCallum, Indigenous Women, 
Work, and History 1940-1980 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2014); John S. Lutz, Makúk: A 
New History of Aboriginal-White Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); Adele Perry, On the Edge of 
Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2001). Also, Michelle Desveaux, Patrick Chassé, Glenn Iceton, Anne Janhunen, and Omeasoo 
Wāhpāsiw, “Twenty-first Century Indigenous Historiography: Twenty-two Must-Read Books,” Canadian 
Journal of History, vol. 50, no. 3 (2015), pp. 524-548.
6 Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta, “Making Indigenous People ‘Immigrants Too’: A Comparison 
of Citizenship Programs for Newcomers and Indigenous Peoples in Postwar Canada, 1940s–1960s,” 
Canadian Historical Review, vol. 90, no. 3 (2009), pp. 427-461; Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies: 
Indigenous Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-50 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998); P. Whitney 
Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing an Arctic Envrionment,” 
Environmental History, vol. 12, no. 4 (2007), pp. 920-950. Especially relevant to this article is Dominique 
Marshall and Julia Sterparn, “Oxfam Aid to Canada’s First Nations, 1962-1975: Eating Lynx, Starving for 
Jobs, and Flying a Talking Bird,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, vol. 23, no. 2 (2012), pp. 
298-343. 
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Canadian aid and Indian policies, highlighting how intersecting notions of 
‘modernization,’ liberal-capitalist preoccupations, and racialized understandings 
of development informed Canadian efforts in both fields. This exploration is in 
service to my larger research project exploring how the history of relations between 
Indigenous peoples and Canada informed the early years of Canadian foreign 
aid, and conversely, how Canadian encounters with the Global South shaped 
Indigenous-Canadian relations after 1945. One of the goals is to obtain different 
perspectives on Canada’s international history and the Canadian dimension of an 
emerging global history of development by paying greater attention to the so-
called domestic context.7 Another aim is to seek new insight on Indigenous-settler 
relations in Canada by refracting these through the prism of international history.8 
The Development Gaze in Canada and Abroad after 1945
As Canadian officials looked toward the country’s northern reaches after the Second 
World War, they did so through the era’s lenses of “development,” “modernization,” 
and a belief in government’s capacity, by drawing on scientific and social-science 
expertise, to effect meaningful and beneficial change. The origins of “technical 
assistance”—the providing of non-financial assistance in the form of experts and 
expertise—lay in a long history of colonial development, missionary work, and 
growing state involvement in the economy. More immediately, technical assistance 
emerged under the broader rubric of foreign aid in response to the challenge of 
post-war reconstruction and the perceived necessity of improving the social and 
economic conditions of the world’s peoples, not least those in the colonized or 
semi-colonized world. Building on pre-war precedents, the United Nations at its 
creation in October 1945 launched a number of technical-assistance initiatives. 
U.S. President Harry S. Truman’s second inaugural address, in 1949, which called 
for “a bold new program for … the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas” helped make the idea a global phenomenon. The following year, a UN 
conference heralded the birth of the organization’s Expanded Technical Assistance 
Program and the UN Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA).9
Canada’s Hugh Keenleyside (1898-1992), inaugural head of the UNTAA, 
painted UN technical-assistance efforts in near-messianic terms, “a revolution 
in human affairs” through “a universal mechanism [enabling] all people to draw 
upon the whole body of human knowledge.”10 Keenleyside already boasted an 
7 Amanda Kay McVety, Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Aid Policy in Ethiopia (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); Michael E. Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, 
Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2011); David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of 
Modernization,” Diplomatic History, vol. 33, no. 3 (2009), pp. 375-385. Also, see the forum on Native 
Americans and American international history in Diplomatic History, vol. 39, no. 5 (Nov. 2015), pp. 926–
966. For a useful demonstration of the transnational turn in the Canadian context, see Karen Dubinsky, 
Adele Perry, and Henry Yu, eds., Within and Without the Nation: Canadian History as Transnational 
History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).
8 Hayden King, “The Erasure of Indigenous Thought in Foreign Policy,” OpenCanada.org, July 31, 2017. https://
www.opencanada.org/features/erasure-indigenous-thought-foreign-policy/; [accessed Oct. 2, 2017].
9 Latham, Right Kind of Revolution, 10; Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to 
Global Faith, 4th ed. (London and New York: Zed Books, 2014), pp. 47-79.
10 LAC, MG 31-E102, Hugh L. Keenleyside fonds (HLK)/28/20, Historical Background of the Idea of 
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impressive career by the time he took up the reins at the UNTAA; in addition 
to diplomatic postings to Japan and Mexico, by the early 1940s he had risen to 
the senior ranks of the Department of External Affairs (DEA). He had served 
on the council of the Northwest Territories and as commissioner (1947-50), as 
well as deputy minister of the federal Department of Mines and Resources, which 
housed the Department of Indian Affairs and also had responsibility for the Inuit. 
Just before heading up the UNTAA, he led a UN technical-assistance mission to 
Bolivia. Here was someone who in effect personified the convergence of Canada’s 
Indian and aid policies.11
Keenleyside was just one example of Canada’s contribution to the technical 
assistance phenomenon. In addition to the country’s wartime and post-war aid, its 
participation in UN organs, and the involvement of individuals in the transnational 
bureaucratic, religious, academic, and intellectual networks producing the 
discourse and ideas associated with technical assistance, Canadians worked all 
over the world under UN auspices.12 During the 1950 conference that launched 
the UN’s Expanded Technical Assistance Program, Canada’s representative, John 
W. Holmes, declared that Canada’s most valuable contribution would be its ability 
to “[share] the experience [it had] gained in taming [its] own vast territories.” 
The high-ranking diplomat emphasized Canadian expertise in hydroelectricity, 
irrigation, and forestry as invaluable to “countries which, like ourselves, are seeking 
to develop their natural resources.”13 Jean Lesage, as parliamentary assistant to the 
secretary of state for external affairs, chaired a follow-up conference in Paris in 
1952.14 
Consistent with the broader history of technical assistance, a logic of empire 
influenced Canadian aid efforts. After all, the knowledge transfer that Keenleyside 
lauded was to occur largely along circuits forged by Western imperialism, with 
the beneficiaries summoned to assist the victims. Canadians had participated 
in the diverse array of missionary networks—a crucial precursor—and many 
administrators of Canada’s aid were ‘mish kids’ who grew up in that milieu.15 In a 
UN debate on colonial development, Canada’s representative declared it a “sacred 
trust” and “solemn responsibility” to ensure the “well-being of the inhabitants of 
all non-self-governing territories.”16 Canadian deference to the colonial powers 
International Aid, speech delivered at Duke University, Durham, NC, 29-30 Sept. 1955 (hereafter 
Historical Background).
11 David Webster, “Modern Missionaries: Canadian Postwar Technical Assistance Advisors in Southeast 
Asia,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, vol. 20, no. 2 (2009), pp. 86-111.
12 LAC, RG 25, Department of External Affairs (DEA)/6441/5475-DU-3-40/1, Telegram from Acting 
Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United Nations to SSEA, June 13, 1950; Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, 
30; Webster, “Modern Missionaries”; Brouwer, Canada’s Global Villagers.
13 LAC/DEA/6441/5475-DU-3-40/1, Telegram from Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United 
Nations to SSEA, June 13, 1950.
14 LAC/DEA/8148/5475-DU-18-40/1, Memorandum for Reid from Léger, Jan. 23, 1952; LAC/
DEA/8148/5475-DU-18-40/1, Telegram from Chairman, Canadian Delegation, UN Assembly, Paris, to 
SSEA, Feb. 3, 1952.
15 John Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Vol. 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), pp. 191-192.
16 LAC/DEA/2569/5475-AT-40/1, Annex I—Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly, Address by the 
Honourable W. McL. Robertson in Committee IV on 14 November 1946.
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in this regard (notably Britain) included a tendency to conflate Canada—and its 
gradual emergence as an independent actor on the world stage—with colonial 
territories. 17 No thought was given to the idea Canada was itself a practitioner of 
empire, not least in terms of its relationship with the Indigenous peoples within 
its borders.18 
Empire (and its afterlife) sat at the heart of what proved to be the primary 
vehicle for Canadian technical assistance: the Colombo Plan. Humanitarian 
and developmental justifications would loom large after the fact, but Ottawa’s 
initial motivations for helping establish it were economic and geopolitical. Also 
significant was a desire among certain members of the diplomatic establishment 
to forge a special relationship with post-independence India. Jill Campbell-Miller 
has shown how monetary relations between Britain and India shaped Canada’s 
aid relationship with South and Southeast Asia.19 An additional and increasing 
concern, especially following the advent of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, was checking communist influence. Cold War calculations intersected 
with preoccupations over poverty in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. All of these 
considerations gave rise to a proposal during a Commonwealth foreign ministers 
conference in Colombo in January 1950 for a plan to offer capital investment and 
technical assistance in South and Southeast Asia. Paralleling the UN’s expanding 
technical assistance activities and emerging U.S. aid, follow-up meetings in 
Sydney and London over the ensuing year produced a program for technical 
assistance within the broader Colombo Plan. This program consisted of an array 
of bilateral aid agreements between donor and recipient countries.20 
In the early going, official Canadian attitudes to technical assistance tended 
to be cautious, if not parsimonious. Rather than “grandiose projects [that] will 
wither away,” Ottawa preferred initiatives that would “contribute to increasing 
food supplies, improving health and social standards, efficient administration, 
and developing essential natural resources.”21 Similarly, Canada only gradually 
became an enthusiastic participant in the Colombo Plan. Intense debate within 
the government over the scope of Canadian participation in the Commonwealth 
scheme ended in February 1951 with a compromise: Canada’s initial contribution 
17 LAC/DEA/2569/5475-AT-40/1, Annex I—Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly, Address 
by the Honourable W. McL. Robertson in Committee IV on 14 November 1946. Thus Liberal Senator 
Wishart McLea Robertson, government leader in the Senate, could tell the UN General Assembly’s Fourth 
Committee he had “never been in Africa,” but was the “citizen of a country … once a non-self-governing 
territory under the administration of the United Kingdom and I can testify … no nation on earth has a 
prouder record in the field of human relations than has the United Kingdom.” 
18 For example, when the UN secretary-general asked Ottawa about the potential applicability of article 
73 of the UN Charter—the declaration regarding “non-self-governing territories,” it dismissed the idea 
that Canada’s Indian reserves or northern territories could be considered to be such; the very suggestion 
was “nonsensical,” if not “absurd.” LAC/DEA/2569/5475-AT-40/1, Memorandum for Hopkins from M.W. 
(likely Wershof), Aug. 14, 1946.
19 Jill Campbell-Miller, “The Mind of Modernity: Canadian Bilateral Foreign Assistance to India, 1950-
1960” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Waterloo, 2014), p. 78.
20 Campbell-Miller, “Mind of Modernity,” pp. 56-57; LAC/DEA/6574/11038-40/2, Cabinet Minute, June 15, 
1950.
21 LAC/DEA/6441/5475-DU-3-40/1, Telegram from Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United 
Nations to the SSEA, June 13, 1950.
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of C$25 million—including $400,000 earmarked for technical assistance—was 
predicated on India using $10-15 million of it to purchase Canadian wheat.22
The place of wheat sales in Ottawa’s Colombo Plan calculations highlights 
agriculture’s central place in early Canadian aid—perhaps not surprising, given the 
country’s vast farming resources and the launch of the UN’s Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) in Quebec City in October 1945. A more practical concern 
also informed the importance attached to agriculture; DEA officials felt that 
Canada’s rapidly expanding manufacturing sector had prior claim on the country’s 
industrial experts.23 Moreover, Ottawa’s emphasizing of agriculture reflected the 
widespread belief that increased food production was crucial to stability and the 
longer-term viability of development efforts.24
Accordingly, the boosting of food supplies topped Canadian priorities at the 
UN Technical Assistance conference in 1950.25 Similarly, a DEA preliminary 
assessment of Canadian facilities available for the Colombo Plan put agriculture 
at the top of those areas where Canada’s public service, universities, and private 
industry could contribute.26 Barely a year into the plan’s operations, DEA 
officials, disappointed at the slow progress opined that they had “probably” been 
concentrating too much on “technical assistance of a too highly advanced and 
specialized type.” They recommended “get[ting] back to the principles”—starting 
with efforts to increase food supplies—that had informed Canada’s original 
decision to participate.27 
Such a recommendation draws attention to how, beyond practical 
considerations, an idea of “modernization” informed the Canadian interest in 
agriculture. Modernization theory—the product of a teleological and racialized 
logic that shaped Western attitudes about the Global South and post-war aid—drew 
on the social sciences to posit a dichotomous relationship between the ‘traditional’ 
and the ‘modern,’ working from a Eurocentric and linear understanding of societal 
development from pre-agricultural to consumer society.28 Grounded in earlier ideas 
about social evolution that were a by-product of European imperialism and the 
22 Sales of the wheat generated funds that New Delhi devoted to capital projects. More immediately, the 
move responded to an acute grain shortage in the country. LAC/DEA/6575/11038-40/5.2, Memorandum 
from Plumptre to the Under-Secretary, Jan. 29, 1951; Greg Donaghy, “Coming off the Gold Standard, 
Re-assessing the ‘Golden Age’ of Canadian Diplomacy,” Johnson-Shoyama School of Public Policy, 
University of Saskatchewan, pp. 9-10. http://www.schoolofpublicpolicy.sk.ca/_documents/outreach_
event_announcements/DFAIT_symposium/Coming_off_the_Gold_Standard.pdf; [accessed June 6, 2013]. 
23 LAC/DEA/6591/11038-A-40/1, Draft, Appraisal of Facilities Available in Canada for Technical Assistance 
in the Economic Development of South and South East Asia, July 14, 1950.
24 Latham, Right Kind of Revolution, pp. 110-111.
25 LAC/DEA/6441/5475-DU-3-40/1, Telegram from Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate to the United 
Nations, to the SSEA, June 13, 1950.
26 LAC/DEA/6591/11038-A-40/1, Appraisal of Facilities Available in Canada for Technical Assistance in the 
Economic Development of South and South East Asia, July 14, 1950.
27 LAC/DEA/6598/11038-E-40/1, Memorandum for the Interdepartmental Committee on External Trade 
Policy, June 14, 1951.
28 Michael E. Latham, «Introduction: ‘Modernization, International History, and the Cold War World,» in 
David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, Michael E. Latham, eds., Modernization, Development, 
and the Global Cold War (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), p. 4; Nick Cullather, 
“Modernization Theory,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 218.
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rise of modernity, modernization theory was an expression of ‘high modernism.’ 
James C. Scott describes this as flowing from a “self-confidence about scientific 
and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of 
human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the 
rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of 
natural laws.” Pluralistic and transnational in their origin and scope, notions of 
modernization and high modernism harnessed to state power found appeal and 
expression across the political spectrum. 29
Modernization theory, not least its race and gender thinking, permeated 
the diverse facets of Canada’s technical assistance. After all, modernization 
theory was a phenomenon and discourse to which Canadians—overwhelmingly 
white and male ones—actively contributed. The logic of modernization was 
apparent in the rise of the social sciences in Canadian public policy, including 
the aid sector. Official documents from the period are replete with references to 
“underdeveloped” or “backward” areas and peoples.30 A linear understanding 
of progress was apparent as DEA officials expressed relief that the programs 
emerging from the London follow-up conference in 1950 fleshing out the 
Colombo Plan emphasized the improving of agriculture, health, education, public 
utilities, and transportation, rather than rapid industrialization. Consistent with 
more incrementalist understandings of modernization theory, officials argued that 
industrialization would result gradually at a later stage.31 
It was a decidedly liberal-capitalist version of modernization that informed 
Canadian aid efforts. As a constituent of the “liberal core,” Canada participated 
actively in a post-war capitalist international system with the U.S. as the 
“fulcrum.”32 In addition to Ottawa’s keenness to secure American involvement 
in the Colombo Plan, this liberal-capitalist worldview was apparent as Canadian 
officials evinced a North America-centrism in which Canada and the U.S. 
occupied the apex of the developmental pyramid.33 Lauding technical assistance 
at a Duke University conference in 1955, Hugh Keenleyside cited the role of 
American investment in Canada’s industrial development and enthused that if the 
dynamic could be replicated “during the next fifty years in even a small part of the 
29 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 4. On the impact of Scott’s work on Canadian 
historiography, as well as for examples of high modernism in the Canadian context, see Tina Loo, “High 
Modernism, Conflict, and the Nature of Change in Canada: A Look at Seeing Like a State,” Canadian 
Historical Review vol. 97, no. 1 (March 2016), pp. 34-58. Also, see Matthew Farish and P. Whitney 
Lackenbauer, “High Modernism in the Arctic: Planning Frobisher Bay and Inuvik,” Journal of Historical 
Geography vol. 35, no. 3 (July 2009), pp. 517-544.
30 LAC/DEA/6592/11038-A-40/1.2, Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan, Dec. 29, 1950.
31 LAC/DEA/6592/11038-A-40/1.2, Telex from Acting High Commissioner to SSEA, Sept. 19, 1950. 
32 Robert Latham, The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security, and the Making of Postwar International Order 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 40, 112; Robert D. Cuff and J. L. Granatstein, Ties that 
Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime, from the Great War to the Cold War, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1977), pp. 69-92; Bruce Muirhead, The Development of Postwar Canadian 
Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European Option (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1992), pp. 16-46.
33 LAC/DEA/6592/11038-A-40/1.2, Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan, Dec. 29, 1950.
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underdeveloped areas of the world, the commercial results in the United States 
and in other industrial countries would be of fantastic proportions.”34 
In addition to the desire to incorporate more and more of the globe into 
the liberal-capitalist order, Canadian aid efforts bespoke an abiding concern to 
inculcate a capitalist work ethic based on patriarchal notions of the male wage 
earner and individual responsibility. DEA officials anticipated, after all, that 
Canada’s aid would be short term, as recipient countries would “make such 
profitable use of this aid that they would soon be free from the need of outside 
assistance.”35 The concern to avoid fostering dependence and the related notion of 
the ‘deserving poor’ were apparent as the minister of agriculture, James Gardiner, 
claimed that “India’s poverty could be solved by a sale of the pooled jewellery of 
the Maharajahs.”36 
Beyond racial condescension and the abject refusal to acknowledge 
imperialism’s devastating socioeconomic impact, Gardiner’s expressing such 
sentiments highlights how Canadian aid efforts were emerging in parallel to 
Ottawa’s embrace of a moderate Keynesianism to ensure the smooth functioning 
of the Canadian economy, alongside the growth growth of the welfare state. As 
others have observed about the history of U.S. development assistance, Canadians’ 
belief in the capacity and necessity of government action to effect what was viewed 
as positive change for the Global South represented the projection overseas of 
domestic public policy.37
The Keynesianism impulse and the broader development phenomenon also 
informed the contemporaneous rethinking of Canada’s approach to its Indigenous 
peoples. The push for change to an Indian policy that sought assimilation yet 
produced utter marginalization had grown between the wars, stoked by a growing 
Indigenous activism and demographic revival. The racially charged horrors of 
the Second World War, the creation of the UN system, and Canada’s growing 
international profile further spurred this critique, as did the growing influence 
of the social sciences on a government focusing on post-war reconstruction. 
The pressure for reform led to the creation in 1946 of a joint (Commons and 
Senate) parliamentary committee that reviewed Canada’s Indian policy.38 Typical 
of the reformist yet paternalistic impetus were the calls from the Vancouver 
Civil Liberties Union (VCLU) for a “more humanistic, realistic, and democratic 
awareness of both the potentialities and welfare of the Indians,” especially since 
their education, as well as their social, economic and health conditions were “in 
grave need of radical improvement,” as they had been “forced into the position of 
34 LAC/HLK/28/20, Historical Background.
35 LAC/DEA/6592/11038-A-40/1.2, Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan, Dec. 29, 1950. On 
the interplay between capitalism and development efforts, see Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve: 
Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 
p. 21.
36 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, p. 29.
37 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World 
Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 40-76.
38 J. R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada, 3rd ed. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), pp. 311-327. 
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a lower or a degraded race.”39 The tone was symptomatic of broader trends; the 
drive for reform culminated in amendments to the Indian Act in 1951 that ignored 
Indigenous input and left intact an infantilizing, assimilationist regime.40 
 Indigenous peoples also had to contend with ongoing encroachments on 
their territories and assaults on their ways of life as a new wave of resource 
extraction fuelled the post-war economic boom. Brittany Luby has explored, for 
example, how hydroelectric development on the Winnipeg River in the 1950s 
affected the foodways of Anishinabek women and their infants, underscoring 
high modernism’s dramatic impact on Indigenous bodies, lives, and sociocultural 
realities.41 Paralleling this Keynesian-era economic activity, Canada’s Indigenous 
peoples were swept up in the ambitions of an increasingly interventionist 
Canadian welfare state determined to slot them into the liberal capitalist order.42 
As Hugh Shewell has argued, “Indians collectively represented a social problem 
that could be solved through the application of scientific knowledge … [T]he 
solution to the problem lay in finding ways to help them adjust as individuals to 
the ‘natural forces’ of modern society.”43 Hence, the ‘Indian problem’ to be solved 
through expert knowledge was how to most effectively encourage Indigenous 
people to abandon their identity and assimilate into the Canadian liberal-capitalist 
mainstream as self-reliant individuals.44 
The logic of modernization and the high modernist ethos informing Canadian 
Indian policy after 1945 was obvious as the VCLU advocated a policy of “cultural 
forcing,” that would come from “modern ‘improvement’ techniques,” that 
“psychologists, sociologists and educationists” would endorse.45 The dynamic 
was similarly apparent in the federal Indian Placement and Relocation Program 
39 LAC, MG32-B34, J.W. Pickersgill Fonds (henceforth JWP)/24/11-IA 12, “Help the Indians Help 
Themselves,” Brief by Vancouver Branch, Canadian Civil Liberties Union, February 1951 (henceforth 
“Help the Indians”), pp. 3, 5, 42.
40 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, pp. 325-327. 
41 Brittany Luby, “From Milk-Medicine to Public (Re)Education Programs: An Examination of Anishinabek 
Mothers’ Reponses to Hydroelectric Flooding in the Treaty #3 District, 1900-1975,” Canadian Bulletin of 
Medical History vol. 32, no. 2 (2015), pp. 363-389.
42 In some cases, literally swept up: Raven Sinclair, “Identity Lost and Found: Lessons from the Sixties 
Scoop,” First Peoples Child & Family Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (2007), pp. 65-82. Other useful discussions 
of Indigenous-Canadian encounters in the Keynesian era include McCallum, Indigenous Women, Work, 
and History 1940-1980, especially her account of the Department of National Health and Welfare’s 
Community Health Representatives (CHR) program [pp. 120-166]. McCallum emphasizes how the 
precepts of ‘community development,’ linked closely to international development, informed the program, 
which envisioned Indigenous individuals acting as “liaisons between First Nations and Inuit communities 
and non-local health professionals” employed by Ottawa. Moreover, the CHR program’s founder and 
director, Ethel Martens, was subsequently very active in international development circles. Also, see 
Allyson Stevenson, “The Adoption of Frances T: Blood, Belonging, and Aboriginal Transracial Adoption 
in Twentieth-Century Canada,” Canadian Journal of History, vol. 50, no. 3 (2015), pp. 469-491; Kristin 
Burnett, Travis Hay, and Lori Chambers, “Settler Colonialism, Indigenous Peoples and Food: Federal 
Indian Policies and Nutrition Programs in the Canadian North since 1945,” Journal of Colonialism & 
Colonial History, vol. 17, no. 2 (2016); Will Langford, “Jean Lagassé, Community Development, and the 
‘Indian and Métis Problem’ in Manitoba in the 1950s and 1960s,” Canadian Historical Review vol. 97, no. 
3 (Sept.2016), pp. 346-376.
43 Hugh Shewell, “‘What Makes the Indian Tick?’ The Influence of Social Sciences on Canada’s Indian 
Policy, 1947-1964,” Histoire sociale / Social History vol. 34, no. 67 (2001), pp. 138, 146.
44 Shewell, “What Makes the Indian Tick?”, p. 140.
45 LAC/JWP/24/11-IA12, “Help the Indians,” pp. 11, 15.
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(1957), which Mary Jane Logan McCallum has explored. The program was framed 
by “three oft-repeated, circular, and interconnected narratives about Indigenous 
modernity”: industrial capitalism’s inevitable eclipse of “traditional” Indian 
economies (and thus the need to avoid Indigenous dependence on the taxpayer); 
full-time wage employment as the surest route to Indigenous equality in Canada; 
and a belief that the country’s Indigenous population had obtained the levels of 
education and training required for employment and equality.46
Canadian Colonialism and the Inuit: The Logic of Development
The situation differed somewhat for the Inuit. No provision had been made 
for the Inuit in the British North America Act (1867), because Britain retained 
possession of the Arctic. Nothing changed when London transferred the region to 
Canadian control in 1880. The federal government only assumed some measure 
of administrative obligation in 1924, giving the responsibility to the Department 
of Indian Affairs. Yet, parliament did not apply the Indian Act to the Inuit; there 
was no ‘Inuit status’ or an ‘Inuit Act’, and before the 1920s had ended Ottawa had 
transferred responsibility for Inuit affairs to the commissioner of the Northwest 
Territories. This administrative evolution stemmed partly from a concern to avoid 
reproducing the dynamic marking Canada’s relations with the First Nations, 
notably the creation of reserves and government guardianship. Far from being an 
acknowledgement of the ravages of settler colonialism, this attitude was informed 
by the priority accorded to facilitating Canadian dominion over the Arctic with 
a view to resource extraction. The extraction imperative, visible throughout 
the history of Euro-Canadian visions of the region, was apparent as Ottawa 
transferred responsibility for the Inuit to the Department of Mines and Resources 
in the 1930s.47 
All told, a conservative imperial dynamic informed a policy of neglect summed 
up by the slogan ‘Leave the Eskimo alone.’ It was a measure of official indifference 
that Inuit affairs became a subject of constitutional dispute when the federal and 
Quebec governments each sought to displace onto the other the responsibility for 
the Inuit of northern Quebec.48 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in 1939 that the Inuit were ‘Indians’ under the law and thus a federal 
responsibility, Ottawa maintained a laissez-faire policy well into the 1940s, 
justifying this by saying that maintaining ‘traditional’ ways would avoid fostering 
dependence. The concern to keep costs low and avoid encouraging dependency 
translated into a putative concern to maintain the Inuit in their traditional way of 
life, but meant ultimately an approach Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent famously 
summed up in 1953 by declaring that “We have administered these vast territories 
of the north in an almost continuing state of absence of mind.”49
46 McCallum, Indigenous Women, Work, and History, p. 73.
47 Cameron, Far Off Metal River, pp. 90-92; Frank J. Tester and Peter Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes) 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), pp. 14-34.
48 Tester and Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes), pp. 14-34.
49 Tester and Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes), p. 56.
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Yet, consistent with broader trends in Canadian Indian policy and the 
Keynesian moment, pressure for reform and a more interventionist approach grew 
in the 1940s. R.A. Gibson, deputy commissioner of the Northwest Territories, 
declared that “the condition of the Eskimo is not at all satisfactory” and that the 
Inuit population was “undoubtedly … the worst off of any natives for whom the 
Dominion has accepted responsibility.”50 The social and economic disruptions 
provoked by the fur trade, the negative consequences flowing from the North’s 
wartime militarization, along with growing disquiet over the medical condition 
of the Inuit—in short, the consequences of colonialism—combined to make the 
policy of neglect increasingly untenable, even while serving as justification for a 
new wave of internal colonization. 
The deepening Cold War also spurred official interest in the Inuit. The 
Arctic’s enhanced geopolitical importance encouraged Ottawa to view and 
portray the Inuit as a vital part of Canada’s first line of defence.51 Here was another 
‘underdeveloped’ population that was to be accorded aid in order to safeguard 
against the Soviet menace. Interwoven with such Cold War motivations were 
sovereignty concerns; the northward extension of the Canadian welfare state 
and heightened federal interest in the Inuit allowed Canada to assert its authority 
amid an expanding U.S. military presence in a region promoted as a new frontier 
essential to future Canadian prosperity.52 
The Arctic and its Indigenous populations were thus increasingly the objects 
of internal colonization by the Canadian State. The era of “Leave the Eskimo 
alone” was over; henceforth, the Inuit and their lands were to be absorbed into 
the Canadian body politic. As Ottawa, spurred by a host of motivations, sought to 
project its authority and action northward, federal bureaucrats strove to refashion 
the lives and practices of the Inuit and First Nations of the region.53 The dynamic 
was apparent amid the northward extension of the ‘family allowance’ program. 
Beyond not respecting traditional Inuit child-rearing practices, not least given the 
priority accorded to male-headed nuclear families, Inuit suffered discrimination 
by being obliged to accept payments in kind, having to select goods from a 
government-approved list.54 Similarly indicative was the Department of Mines and 
Resources publication, The Book of Wisdom for Eskimo, which presupposed the 
inferiority of Indigenous knowledge regarding every aspect of daily life, including 
hunting and wildlife conservation. Emilie Cameron sees the booklet as signalling 
“the beginning of an intensified interest in the production of Inuit as a healthy, 
compliant, ‘modern’, wage-earning population.”55 Inuit readers were chided that 
“the white man brought you the rifle which enable you to secure your food with 
50 LAC/DEA/3306/9059-A-40/1, Letter from Gibson to Keenleyside, Dec. 14, 1945 (attached report dated 
Nov. 11, 1943).
51 Lackenbauer and Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil”; Matthew S. Wiseman, “Unlocking the 
‘Eskimo Secret’: Defence Science in the Cold War Canadian Arctic, 1947-1954,” Journal of the Canadian 
Historical Association vol. 26, no. 1 (2015), pp. 191-223. 
52 Tester and Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes), pp. 116-119; Sangster, Iconic North, p. 7.
53 On the relevance of Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality,’ see Cameron, Far Off Metal River, 
pp. 118-121; Li, Will to Improve, pp. 6-8.
54 Tester and Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes), pp. 71-94.
55 Cameron, Far Off Metal River, p. 118.
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greater ease than your fathers did. But you did not use your rifle wisely. You 
killed the caribou in much greater numbers than you needed … Today there are 
many areas where no caribou can be found and the walrus too have disappeared 
from many parts.”56 Here was another chapter in Canadian colonialism’s lengthy 
history of instrumentalizing food as it sought to control Indigenous peoples and 
their lands.57
Indeed, the question of food security became a barometer of increasing official 
interest in the Inuit. Already on the government’s radar in the interwar period, 
such concerns grew in the late 1940s as the price of white fox fur pelts collapsed 
with deleterious effects on those Inuit who participated in the trapping economy. 
Even more significant, however, was what government scientists perceived, 
constructed, and promoted as a ‘caribou crisis.’ Inchoate concerns over wildlife 
conservation between about 1900 and 1930 gave rise to a federal belief in the 
necessity of game management. This shift strengthened the intervention impetus, 
and Ottawa heightened surveillance and regulation of Indigenous hunting and 
trapping.58 
In 1948, A.W.F. Banfield, chief mammalogist of the fledgling Dominion 
Wildlife Service, warned publicly that the loss of barren-ground caribou herds 
was harming Inuit in the eastern Arctic, particularly Ungava. Blaming the situation 
on Indigenous overhunting, he called for more conservation.59 Such claims were 
by no means innocent with regard to settler colonialism. Banfield’s declarations 
and the broader ‘caribou crisis’ he warned of are part of a much larger history 
of dispossession predicated on the idea of the incapacity of Indigenous peoples 
to recognize the importance of their environment and manage it wisely. Such 
notions were used to justify settler domination (and sovereignty); paternalistic 
claims to ensuring Indigenous food security usefully cloaked the broader ambition 
of resource extraction.60 
Reports of starvation reinforced federal worries over Inuit living conditions. 
Especially significant was the controversy that Farley Mowat’s People of the 
Deer (1952) sparked. Serialized in the American magazine The Atlantic and 
prompting questions in the House of Commons to Jean Lesage, by then minister 
56 Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs, Lands, 
Parks and Forests Branch, The Book of Wisdom for Eskimo, trans. Samuel G. Ford, sketches by Betty 
Kosior (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1947), p. 23. 
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residential schools and saw other children targeted in the Sixties Scoop. 
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of northern affairs and national resources, the book told a tale of criminal neglect 
by a government facing the starvation of the Ahiarmiut in the interior of the 
Northwest Territories. Government discomfort was all the more acute given that 
the international embarrassment over Canada’s treatment of the Ahiarmiut came 
amid the expansion of its foreign aid.61
The People of the Deer controversy erupted just as the Canadian state was 
adopting a more interventionist approach regarding the Inuit that would facilitate 
the country’s northward expansion. In May 1952, a government conference had 
been held to “consider and recommend action on the problems of Canada’s Eskimo 
population.”62 Consistent with broader trends, the official response remained 
informed by an assimilationist ethos and racial paternalism. H.A. Proctor, assistant 
director of Indian Health Services in the Department of National Health and Welfare, 
declared that the Inuit, as “citizens of an enlightened and moderately prosperous 
Canada … deserve[d] greater attention,” before pronouncing that “[t]heir 
civilization, because it is without hope of advancement, should be ruthlessly 
discouraged.” He saw no “future for a discrete civilization in the Canadian Arctic” 
and thought it “moronic to support and encourage the Eskimo in his paleolithic 
crusade.”63 Reflecting the patriarchal attitudes associated with Canada’s post-war 
order, Proctor prescribed technical training for Inuit men and the development of 
a needlecraft cottage industry for Inuit women.64
Government observers considered Inuit assimilation into the liberal-capitalist 
mainstream all the more inevitable given that the anticipated resource extraction, 
predicated on the dismissal of Indigenous land rights, would bring the Inuit 
into increasing contact with the Euro-Canadian majority. It was no accident, for 
example, that excepting health care, the Department of Mines and Resources 
retained responsibility for Inuit affairs. Following a rejigging of the bureaucracy 
in 1953, all of this fell to the new DNANR. While still deputy minister of the 
former, Hugh Keenleyside depicted a Canadian Arctic in which 
the contacts between the Eskimo and Indian people and their white neighbours 
will multiply in number and increase in intimacy. The dynamic qualities of modern 
civilization will not indefinitely permit of compromise with backward modes of 
life … Inevitably … the greater ease and enlarged comfort that can be provided by 
the use of the equipment and technique of the outside world will become apparent 
to the Indian and the Eskimo … Along with the material arts of civilized life, the 
northern natives will tend to adopt the social and intellectual standards and concepts 
of their new neighbours.65 
61 Tester and Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes), p. 56; Kulchyski and Tester, Kiumajut (Talking Back), p. 50; 
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62 LAC/NAP/1234/251-1/2, News Release, Department of Resources and Development, Editorial and 
Information Division, May 22, 1952. 
63 LAC/NAP/1234/251-1/3, “The Future of the Canadian Eskimo,” H.A. Proctor, March 28, 1952. 
64 LAC/NAP/1234/251-1/3, “The Future of the Canadian Eskimo,” H.A. Proctor, March 28, 1952. 
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Ottawa accordingly wanted action “to see that these people are given a chance to 
survive and to become an asset instead of a liability.”66 Pushing a liberal-capitalist 
work ethic collided with long-standing racial tropes and gender attitudes. 
Thomas H. Manning, a British-Canadian explorer who had conducted research 
in the Arctic for Britain’s Royal Geographical Survey, claimed that “once relief 
is given, the Eskimo, more than the white, prefer to get something for nothing, 
and it soon becomes a habit.”67 J.W. Mackinnon, superintendent of education in 
the Northwest Territories’ Mackenzie District, declared it “a well-known fact that 
many of the Native people are lazy and lack initiative,” and thus recommended 
they be compelled to work for relief rations, as this “would produce a more healthy 
type of people.”68 The assimilation of Canada’s Indigenous peoples was thus 
understood as part of the broader modernization project; incorporation into the 
liberal-capitalist order would be a crucial and welcome contribution to Indigenous 
development. Keenleyside expressed such sentiment when he characterized the 
“human resources problem” in the Arctic as a “conflict between, but the gradual 
synthesis of, the ways and concepts of neolithic and atomic man.”69 
To be sure, elements in Ottawa continued to believe that Inuit communities 
“should be encouraged and helped to live off the land and to follow their 
traditional way of life.”70 Yet, the growing development mania meant that high 
modernist schemes increasingly eclipsed such views. The trend was apparent as 
the bureaucracy and budget for northern administration expanded.71 Consistent 
with the linear and racialized logic underpinning modernization theory, as well as 
that of Canada as a settler society, officials aimed to encourage the Inuit to adopt 
a settled, agricultural way of life. H.A. Proctor declared that some might “shudder 
at the thought of the free and lordly Eskimo chained to the treadmill of an eight 
hour day and a forty hour week,” but this was to be welcomed, since the hunting-
nomadic lifestyle “chained [the Inuit] to the most inexorable and pitiless treadmill 
ever devised by God or Man.”72 The emphasis on ending the migratory way of life 
informed calls for consolidating the Inuit population in new settlements so that 
Ottawa could deliver government services more rationally and effectively, and 
any remaining hunts “could be properly organized … eliminat[ing] … the present 
endless wanderings for game.”73 
The logic of such high modernist thinking, when taken to its extreme, 
culminated in wholesale relocations of Inuit and other Indigenous communities, 
with tragic results. As with the proposed transplantation of yaks, Canadian officials 
reduced such populations to an element of an environmental landscape, one that 
the Canadian state believed it could manipulate and transfer with impunity to 
66 LAC/DEA/3306/9059-A-40/1, Letter from Gibson to Keenleyside, Dec. 14, 1945 (attached report dated 
Nov. 11, 1943).
67 LAC/DEA/3306/9059-A-40/1, Letter from Parkin to Keenleyside, June 23, 1941 (attached report).
68 LAC/NAP/1069/251-1/1A, Letter from McKinnon to Gibson, Sept. 3, 1949.
69 LAC/HLK/28/3, “The Human Resources Problem.”
70 LAC/NAP/1234/251-1/2, News Release, Department of Resources and Development, Editorial and 
Information Division, May 22, 1952. 
71 Tester and Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes), pp. 58-59.
72 LAC/NAP/1234/251-1/3, “The Future of the Canadian Eskimo,” H.A. Proctor, March 28, 1952.
73 LAC/NAP/1234/251-1/3, Letter from RCMP, Office of the Commissioner, to Cunningham, Aug. 4, 1954.
The Colombo Plan, the Inuit of Ungava and ‘Developing’ Canada’s North
358 Histoire sociale / Social History
realize broader policy objectives.74 Indeed, ‘relocation’ in this context implied 
more than just geographical space; it also involved time, as the Canadian state 
strove to reposition Indigenous peoples on the spectrum of human development by 
severing them from a vanishing ‘traditional’ and inserting them into the Canadian 
liberal-capitalist ‘modern.’75
All of this points to how the post-war development zeitgeist was shaping 
official discussion of Canada’s Indigenous peoples. Keenleyside, after all, 
deployed the same rhetoric and logic of social responsibility in explaining 
Canada’s new appreciation of the Arctic as he did in recounting the emergence of 
the UN Technical Assistance program. 76 According to J.W. McKinnon, it was “a 
self-evident truth that the white man’s way of life is going to prevail in the North,” 
making it crucial that the “Eskimo and Indian population should be educated by 
means of a slow process of adjustment (over a period of perhaps twenty-five years) 
into the Canadian way of life.”77 The trend was equally apparent as the attention 
of Northern Affairs officials was drawn to a Pakistani government development 
program “‘to help villagers to help themselves.’” The U.S.-funded project, positing 
the village as “the basic unit for development purposes,” aimed to transform village 
life by securing the voluntary services of the local unemployed.78 It reminded 
James G. Wright, chief of the DNANR’s Northern Services division, of a scheme 
that Arctic Services had discussed to use “able-bodied relief recipients to improve 
Eskimo settlements,” prompting him to ask James Cantley of Arctic Services 
whether something similar could work in Canada. Cantley preferred to develop 
cottage industries among the Inuit, but acknowledged that this would “require 
time and patient effort,” since “[t]he average Eskimo is the least concerned about 
the precariousness of his present condition and it will take time to convince him 
that he must change his way of life greatly if he is to do more than survive.”79
From India to Ungava …
It was in this context that plans emerged to transplant yaks from India to Ungava. 
Flowing from the emphasis on wildlife management, Inuit food security, a settled 
life, and the logic of liberal-capitalist modernization, federal officials were keen 
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to introduce agriculture, notably animal husbandry, into the Arctic. The post-war 
development phenomenon, it bears repeating, flowed from a much longer history 
of empire and social evolution theories; according to Loo, it was the “scale of the 
changes … envisaged” that was the distinguishing feature of ‘high’ modernism.80 
Accordingly, as they sought to import yaks to Ungava, Canadian officialdom 
and experts built on the ideas and knowledge obtained from past instances of 
environmental imperialism in the Canadian north.81 
When Hugh Keenleyside, then deputy minister of mines and resources, 
waxed enthusiastic in 1950 over agricultural production in the Arctic,82 he was 
encouraged partly by the lengthy (albeit decidedly mixed) record of efforts to 
introduce European plants into the region.83 Nor was the introduction of new 
animal species into the arctic and sub-arctic unprecedented. Liza Piper and John 
Sandlos have chronicled efforts, dating to the 1880s, to introduce livestock into 
the western Arctic, and dominion officials’ interest in importing domesticated 
reindeer from northern Europe, which paralleled their ambition to domesticate 
northern wildlife. Anticipating the post-war discourse of modernization theory, 
and consistent with the transnational dimension of development (and settler 
colonialism), Ottawa noted an American initiative in Alaska that began in the 
1890s to turn Inuit hunters into reindeer herders; the Alaskan Bureau of Education 
had trumpeted in 1917 that “within less than a generation, the Eskimos throughout 
northern and western Alaska have been advanced through one entire stage of 
civilization, from … hunting and fishing to the pastoral stage.”84 Following a 
series of dominion-led pilot projects that met with dubious results and a royal 
commission on developing reindeer and musk-ox industries, Canadian officials 
introduced reindeer into the Mackenzie Valley region in the 1930s, aiming to 
supplement diminishing game resources and provide an alternative means of 
livelihood for the region’s Indigenous population.85 A decade later, with minds 
turning to post-war reconstruction, R.A. Gibson, deputy commissioner of the 
Northwest Territories, had proposed sending a herd of goats to Eskimo Point 
(Araviat, Nunavut), on Hudson Bay’s west coast.86 The DNANR would couch 
its post-war efforts in a language of development and liberal humanitarianism 
and justify it via the precepts of modernization theory; however, they were 
equally predicated on numerous pre-1945 species transplantations, along with 
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National Parks and the International Donation of Wildlife,” in William J. Turkel, ed., Method and Meaning 
in Canadian Environmental History (Toronto: Nelson, 2009), p. 199. MacEachern discusses how dominion 
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the underlying ideas and attitudes—not least the inherent superiority of European 
agricultural knowledge—that derived from imperialism and settler colonialism.87 
As it pursued its vision of northern development, Northern Affairs came to 
view Fort Chimo (Kuujjuaq) on Ungava Bay as “the most promising area” to 
introduce animal husbandry.88 The region was home to migratory Inuit when the 
Hudson’s Bay Company established a trading post in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Their gradual incorporation into the fur trade anticipated the construction of an 
American air base during the Second World War. Dorothy Mesher, born and raised 
in Fort Chimo, has recalled how “our lives immediately changed” from the moment 
the base was constructed.89 By the mid-1950s, Fort Chimo’s population was about 
400, mostly Inuit who had been attracted by wartime employment. Ottawa had 
taken control of the base at war’s end, but closed it by the late 1940s, replacing it 
with a Department of Transportation meteorological station.90 Transport officials 
kept a few sheep at Fort Chimo as late as 1948, and prior to that, various Hudson’s 
Bay Company managers had kept some.91 
Especially prominent in the plans for animal husbandry was the Montreal-
based Arctic Institute of North America (AINA), a cross-border, ostensibly 
private research organization with strong ties to government that had emerged out 
of wartime discussions between Canadian and U.S. private and public figures.92 
Emblematic of the Anglo-American milieu from which Canadian aid efforts 
sprang, Marjorie C. Findlay, a Cambridge-educated doctoral candidate at McGill 
University funded by a McGill-AINA-Carnegie scholarship, emerged as an 
important figure in the animal-husbandry project. In autumn 1953, the Montreal 
Gazette reported how, building on her studies of sheep farming in Greenland and 
87 Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 171-194; Aaron Skabelund, “Animals and 
Imperialism: Recent Historiographical Trends,” History Compass, vol. 11, no. 10 (2013), pp. 801-807. 
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Nineteenth-Century France and England,” Victorian Studies, vol. 35, no. 2 (1992), pp. 135-157, on the 
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Anya Zilberstein, “Inured to Empire: Wild Rice and Climate Change,” William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 
72, no. 1 (2015), pp. 127-158, explores attempts to domesticate North American wild rice as a staple that 
could withstand any climatic condition and ensure abundant food for Britain and the empire—especially 
relevant given that Ottawa’s animal-husbandry scheme was accompanied by plans to introduce horticulture, 
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89 Dorothy Mesher (with Ray Woolam), Kuujjuaq—Memories and Musings (Duncan, BC: Unica Publishing 
Co., Ltd., 1995), p. 39.
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Iceland, Findlay hoped to ease the “sorry state of the Eskimos of the Ungava 
Bay region.”93 Although the director of the federal Experimental Farms Service 
doubted “the wisdom of … a woman going alone into that far northern region,”94 
the DNANR hoped to benefit from Findlay’s research. Officials were also in touch 
with the director of the Montreal Botanical Garden, Jacques Rousseau, who saw 
grazing possibilities “pretty near everywhere around 58° lat[titude].”95 James 
Cantley, who believed that “it should [not] be too difficult to persuade some of 
the Eskimos … to convert from a hunting to a producing economy,” met with 
Findlay and Rousseau to discuss introducing sheep, and talks were soon under 
way between Arctic Services and the federal Department of Agriculture.96 
These early discussions were infused with the ambition to incorporate 
Indigenous peoples into the Canadian liberal-capitalist order. Findlay, for example, 
emphasized that “these people must somehow be helped to stand on their own 
feet.”97 The DNANR’s ambition was “to improve and diversify the economy” of 
the Inuit of Ungava by “developing an interest in animal husbandry among them,” 
that, beyond supplying food, would eventually earn them “a reasonable income” 
from selling surplus meat and other products.98 Indeed, Ottawa was anxious to 
find a place for the Inuit in an economic landscape that resource extraction was 
poised to transform. B.G. Sivertz, head of the DNANR’s Arctic Division and 
a former DEA official, observed that mineral development in Ungava “would 
almost certainly result in an increased white population” that would happily create 
a market for locally-produced vegetables and meat.99 The trope of the ‘lazy native’ 
was once again present in such discussions100; amid talk of introducing sheep in 
Fort Chimo, one DNANR official recommended maintaining the flock away from 
the community, since the base offered “social activities in the form of dances and 
picture shows, which … do not contribute to punctual attendance at work.” In his 
estimation, “if the agricultural programme is to develop, it cannot be hampered by 
an inconstant labour staff.”101
Such liberal-capitalist motivations, with their attending attitudes on race and 
gender, informed a larger modernization impulse, namely the plan to encourage 
the Inuit to embrace a settled, agricultural existence. This objective was evident in 
93 LAC/NAP/1069/251-3-7/1, “Sheep Farming among Eskimos Project of English Geographer,” Montreal 
Gazette, Oct. 13, 1953.
94 LAC/NAP/93/251-3-7/2, Memorandum dictated by Hopkins, March 19, 1954. Also, Sangster, Iconic 
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NAP/93/251-3-7/1, Letter to Heslop from Cunningham, Dec. 14, 1953.
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official preoccupations with the Inuit’s sled dogs, symbolic of the migratory, hunting 
life. F.J.G. Cunningham, director of the DNANR’s Northern Administration and 
Lands Branch, expressed the hope that introducing sheep would provide a valid 
excuse to control the animals; moreover, he hoped the Inuit of Ungava would 
“come to accept further ideas of getting along without teams of dogs. They might 
then proceed to a more rational scheme than they have at present for [their use].”102 
The sled-dog issue underscored the racial dynamic underpinning high modernism; 
although a plan to transfer the dogs out of Fort Chimo surfaced early on among the 
“white residents who seem to think it a good idea,” no one consulted the Inuit, the 
excuse being that the plans to introduce sheep were not confirmed.103 
What started out in 1953 as a scheme to introduce sheep progressed quickly to 
yaks. Grant Carman, a research officer in animal husbandry at the Department of 
Agriculture’s Experimental Farm in Ottawa, appears to have been the instigator.104 
Here again, there were precedents. In 1909, the Duke of Bedford had presented a 
small herd to the dominion government in the hope that yaks could crossbreed with 
domestic cattle to produce livestock more suitable for Canada’s climate. Despite 
breeding experiments between the wars, and the Alaskan Agricultural Experiment 
Station’s obtaining yaks from Canada for its own work, a lack of enthusiasm 
led to the animals’ slaughter or distribution to North American zoos in the late 
1930s.105 Officials such as Carman were also echoing Arctic explorer Vihjalmur 
Stefansson, who decades before had promoted domestication of the muskox by 
Inuit as a source of meat and wool that they could also sell on world markets.106 
Spurred by Carman’s suggestion that the yak best responded to the DNANR’s 
vision, investigations gave rise to growing enthusiasm in Arctic Services. By early 
1954, officials believed the yak to be overwhelmingly superior to sheep; it was 
a miraculous beast that could serve as both work animal and food supply, forage 
on its own, and better withstand the harsh climate.107 Excitement only increased 
when the acting director of the FAO’s agricultural division, Ralph W. Phillips, an 
American who had been a U.S. State Department consultant on animal breeding 
in China and India, responded positively to Ottawa’s inquiries.108
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‘So ask your Papa where the Yak may be got’
Phillips’ involvement points to how Canadian Indian and aid policy were 
converging. Indeed, in the wake of the high-ranking FAO official’s expression of 
support, senior DNANR officials viewed Louis St Laurent’s upcoming Asian tour 
as a timely opportunity to discuss the yak scheme with India’s minister of food 
and agriculture.109 It did not take long for Jean Lesage, the new federal minister 
of northern affairs and national resources, to become involved; two years after 
having chaired the UN’s technical assistance conference in Paris, he asked St 
Laurent to inquire of Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru whether India could 
provide a herd of yaks for experimental purposes in northern Quebec. Lesage 
explained his department’s efforts to “improve and diversify the economy of the 
Canadian Eskimos,” as it was “a matter of very great importance if their lives are 
to be given stability and, particularly, if they are to be brought within the fabric 
of the Canadian nation, in an active sense.” Noting that if the project went ahead, 
Canada would require some “‘technical assistance’ as well as ‘capital assistance’” 
from the Indian government, Lesage ventured that
there might be some appeal to Mr. Nehru and to the people of India in the idea that 
it would be possible for them to reciprocate in some measure the assistance that 
Canada has been providing under the Colombo Plan. It might particularly appeal 
to them if they felt that their assistance to us could be in exactly the same character 
as our assistance to them—in the character of helping to improve the productivity 
of underdeveloped parts of Canada and to raise the standard of living of Canadian 
citizens whose lives are now subject to serious economic hazard.110
St Laurent, intent on cultivating a special relationship with India, agreed to raise 
the matter with Nehru if the opportunity arose. 111 Ultimately, however, the two 
men talked about other matters, so the question fell to Canada’s diplomats. They 
presented the proposed project to the Indian Ministry of Finance in explicitly 
developmental terms; Klaus Goldschlag of Canada’s high commission alluded to 
the project being conducted in the framework of the Colombo Plan, reiterating 
Lesage’s earlier arguments.112 According to the high commission, the official Indian 
reaction was positive: “[T]he Indians would very much like to provide assistance 
to Canada under the auspices of the Colombo Plan.”113 Outside government 
circles, the Hindustan Times reported that in a “pleasant reversal of the Colombo 
Plan,” Canada was “looking to India for help in solving the economic problems of 
109 LAC/NAP/93/251-3-7/1, Memorandum for Deputy Minister from Cunningham, Jan. 25, 1954.
110 Note the (ironic) use of quotes around the terms technical assistance and capital assistance, suggesting that 
despite the use of the discourse and form of development, there was reluctance to accept the substance of 
Canada as a recipient of Indian aid. LAC/NAP/93/251-3-7/1, Letter from Lesage to St Laurent, Jan. 26, 
1954.
111 LAC/NAP/93/251-3-7/1, Letter from St Laurent to Lesage, Jan. 27, 1954. Consistent with broader 
continuities between the pre- and post-1945 periods, the linking of the proposal to strengthening Indo-
Canadian relations echoes the longer history of ‘gifting’ animals that MacEachern discusses in “Lost in 
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112 LAC/DEA/8407/11038-Y-2-40, Letter from Goldschlag to Narain, April 23, 1954.
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the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, April 27, 1954.
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her undeveloped areas.” Addressing the ambitiousness of the proposed relocation, 
the Times acknowledged that Ungava was “a cold climate by reason of latitude 
rather than elevation,” but noted that Canadian officials believed “it should be 
sufficiently like the climate of the yaks’ native ‘high regions’ to prove suitable.”114 
Canada’s high commissioner to India, Escott Reid, echoed such enthusiasm. 
An avowed advocate in the DEA for a special Indo-Canadian relationship, Reid 
latched on to the Colombo connection, declaring that “[R]egardless of the project’s 
prospects of success, a Canadian application for Colombo Plan aid is bound to be 
regarded here as a tangible corroboration of the concept of partnership between 
free Asia and the West.” Reid emphasized that the “Indians do not … like to be 
merely recipients of aid from abroad,” and had consequently “already extended 
substantial aid under the Colombo Plan to their less developed Asian neighbours.” 
It thus seemed logical, in an analysis assuming a developmental hierarchy, for 
India to furnish technical assistance to Indigenous people in Canada. All told, Reid 
recommended a Canadian application for Colombo Plan aid, given this would 
“imply … a reciprocity.”115 
As for Inuit reactions regarding the proposed yak importation scheme, there 
is no mention of these in the Canadian government files. Although some Inuit 
women expressed a desire to see chickens introduced to Fort Chimo,116 V.B. 
Heslop, a welfare teacher at the federal day school in the community, relayed 
some local scepticism about the plan to introduce sheep. When the DNANR asked 
her to sound out the Inuit population, she reported that only one individual, Bill 
Saunders, merited being paid attention to, since he alone had any experience 
tending sheep. According to Veslop, Saunders was dismissive: the Inuit, he told 
her, would have to get rid of all their dogs, there was insufficient pasturage for 
summer grazing, and town residents would kill the sheep before their numbers 
increased substantially. Heslop declared “nothing could be gained [from] the other 
natives” since it was akin to “suddenly asking us how we would like to raise 
ostrich or something equally as foreign to us.”117 Her comments, along with the 
virtual absence of Inuit voices in the files, were consistent with a high-modernist 
approach privileging Euro-Canadian voices and knowledge. Notwithstanding the 
liberal-humanitarian language it employed, Ottawa continued to treat the Inuit as 
object rather than subject. In this sense, little differentiated Canada’s development 
efforts in the Arctic from those targeting populations in the Global South.118 
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By February 1954, the Canadian press had caught wind of the yak scheme. 
The Montreal Gazette characterized the government’s animal husbandry initiative 
as “key to turning Ungava’s Eskimos and Indians from government wards into 
self-supporting citizens.”119 As time wore on, however, there were expressions 
of misgiving. The Edmonton Journal declared it better to concentrate on native 
species such as caribou and muskox, or to expand the interwar reindeer project, 
rather than embarking on dubious and perhaps costly ventures such as introducing 
yaks.120 
There was also doubt at External Affairs, where Escott Reid’s colleagues did 
not share his enthusiasm or that of their DNANR counterparts. By June 1954, the 
DEA “firmly opposed” importing yaks via the Colombo Plan.121 Ed Ritchie of the 
economic division claimed that such an initiative could “scarcely be justified” 
under the terms of a program “created exclusively to assist the development and 
raise the standard of living of the lesser developed free areas of South-Eastern 
Asia.”122 R. A. McKay, acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, went 
even further: “We have always considered that India, in turn, might be able to 
assist her neighbours, whose economies are less developed than her own, but there 
has never been a suggestion that she might assist more advanced areas in the 
west.”123 
McKay’s remarks highlighted the race thinking informing Canadian aid and 
Indian policy; consistent with modernization theory, there was a hierarchy of 
development and a top-down logic to aid relationships that meant although Canada 
could provide aid to India, and India could assist its ‘less-developed’ neighbours, 
the notion that India should provide aid to Canada was not to be entertained. 
Furthermore, it appears the logic of internal colonization and concomitant refusal 
to recognize the colonial dynamic between Canada and Indigenous peoples 
excluded the possibility of Canada’s Inuit receiving aid under the auspices of an 
international aid initiative; to the contrary, helping the Inuit cross the threshold 
into a new stage of development was a responsibility the Canadian state had to 
discharge if it and the settler society it governed were to retain legitimacy. 
The DNANR faced another setback when C.S. Barry, chief of the Department 
of Agriculture’s livestock division, informed it that regulations prohibited the 
importing of yaks from India, since “it is known that foot-and-mouth and other 
contagious diseases are rampant among livestock there.”124 J.G. Taggart, deputy 
minister of agriculture, later confirmed this and ruled out any importation under 
quarantine provisions, since the animals could still be carriers.125 Despite the 
dispassionate scientific language employed, Agriculture’s opposition to importing 
yaks from India—and its subsequent suggestion that these could be more safely 
119 LAC/NAP/93/251-3-7/1, “Reindeer, Sheep Ranching Key to Natives’ Security in Ungava,” Montreal 
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120 LAC/NAP/1069/251-3-7/2, Editorial, “Resources on the Hoof,” Edmonton Journal, June 24, 1954.
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125 LAC/NAP/1069/251-3-7/2, Letter from Taggart to Robertson, July 30, 1954.
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obtained from a British zoo—is suggestive of the race thinking at play.126 In a 
period during which Canada’s exclusionist immigration policy remained largely 
intact and ‘white’ expert knowledge was heavily privileged over that of Indigenous 
or Third World populations, the global colour line applied as much to animals as 
it did to people.127 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, the DNANR pressed on in Ungava. By early 
1955, it and the Department of Agriculture were collaborating on a number of 
development projects at Fort Chimo.128 They tried again to introduce sheep, “more 
to try to interest the Eskimos in tending livestock than anything else.”129 The sheep 
arrived in mid-August 1955 and, consistent with the concern to inculcate a liberal-
capitalist ethos, two Inuit families on relief cared for them. Two months later, the 
community’s northern service officer—the DNANR equivalent of a development 
worker—was happily and paternalistically affirming that there was “no doubt 
that some of the Eskimos are capable of tending sheep.”130 In addition to this 
apparent success, experiments at Fort Chimo in growing clover and other grasses 
for grazing were going “exceedingly well.”131 
Such reports only fuelled hope for the animal-husbandry project, and 
by September 1956 yaks were back on the agenda. W.G. Brown, chief of the 
DNANR’s Territorial Division, envisaged them as an “integral part of the future 
economy of the north,” believing it necessary to “consider a possible alternative 
meat supply for the future when caribou are either not available or do not fit into 
the northern pattern of living [emphasis added].”132 Such comments underscore 
DNANR officials’ high-modernist worldview. Indeed, Brown justified plans to 
introduce yak partly on the basis that the “history of civilization … reveals that the 
highest standard of culture were achieved by sedentary people. The culture of the 
nomads was usually of a much lower standard.”133 Also telling was the language 
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the DNANR used to promote its development efforts to the public; depicting the 
hunting-based way of life as keeping humans at a level “not much more than 
animal,” it argued that “the time ha[d] come when [the Inuit] ought to be induced 
to attempt” animal husbandry, especially since it was not “the white man’s way to 
accept the precarious living afforded by the caribou herds.”134 
With the DNANR and Department of Agriculture convinced that animals 
could be raised successfully in northern Canada wherever adequate winter-feed 
could be produced, DNANR eyes turned south. Although yaks from India were 
unacceptable, those from the U.S. could be imported.135 By mid-1957, the Arctic 
Division was in touch with the operator of a game farm in Catskill, New York, 
about yaks on his farm that were progeny of the Canadian herd disposed of in 
the 1930s. With enthusiasm at the highest levels of the DNANR, Ottawa ended 
up purchasing three (!) yaks—one male, two females—that were delivered in 
February 1958.136
Concern about introducing non-indigenous animals into the national-park 
system, along with the fact bovine diseases were already present in the parks, 
prompted the DNANR to keep the yaks on a family farm south of Ottawa.137 The 
plan was to build up the herd and eventually ship it to the Arctic for the next stage 
of the experiment. Meanwhile, anticipating greater northern food production, 
there were parallel efforts to increase cold storage facilities in Ungava, including 
DNANR inquiries about a refrigeration project in Ceylon realized with Canada’s 
Colombo Plan aid.138
Yet, notwithstanding the DNANR’s grand ambitions, problems persisted. 
By the autumn of 1958, it had become apparent that one of the yaks obtained—
Matilda—was not fertile, and had to be exchanged. This was finally accomplished, 
but took some back-and-forth with the Catskill Game Farm, which claimed it had 
never offered a guarantee of the fertility of the yaks it provided.139 Even more 
problematic was the dawning realization, amid the arrival of newborn yaks, that 
it was going to take two to three decades to build up a yak-only herd. Caught 
between the amount of time it would take to produce the numbers required, and 
Agriculture’s continuing opposition to yaks from Asia, elements in the DNANR 
began mooting a cross-breeding program with Highland cattle to expedite 
134 LAC/NAP/94/251-3-7/4, Untitled—Draft of Minister’s Address, March 10, 1956 (c. Feb. 1956).
135 LAC/NAP/1416/251-3-7/5, Memorandum for Phillips from Larmour, Dec. 17, 1956; LAC/NAP/97/251-3-
19/1, Letter from Wells to Sivertz, Sept. 17, 1957.
136 LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, Letter from Phillips to Lindemann, Aug. 12, 1957; LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, 
Letter from Sivertz to Wells, Sept. 11, 1957; LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, Memorandum for Sivertz from 
Cunningham, Oct. 8, 1957; LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, Memorandum for Cunningham from Sivertz, Feb. 
15, 1958.
137 LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, Note for File: Yak Project, L.B. Post, Nov. 7, 1957; LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, 
Memorandum for Cunningham from Sivertz, Feb. 15, 1958. 
138 LAC/NAP/364/251-3-21/1, Letter from Alger to Edwards, Feb. 7, 1958.
139 LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, Memorandum for Sivertz from Bolger, Sept. 29, 1958; LAC/NAP/428/251-3-
19/2, Letter from Thompson to Sivertz, July 10, 1959.
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matters.140 Gordon Robertson, the deputy minister, signed off on the purchase of 
a number of cattle.141
By April 1960, however, amid mounting cost overruns, pessimism had 
grown; suddenly, officials thought it “extremely doubtful that Yak herds [would] 
prove any more successful than Eskimo-operated reindeer herds,” which DNANR 
officials saw as revealing that “wage employment—even if only seasonal—
offers greater attractions” and that the “lonely life of a subsistence herder is not 
compatible with the Eskimos’ gregarious instincts.”142 Despite the essentializing 
logic that echoed earlier culturalist excuses for the failure of federally sponsored 
agricultural programs targeting Indigenous peoples, the observation points to an 
Inuit agency in the face of Canadian state ambitions. After all, the period since 
1945 had witnessed growing federal frustration over the reluctance of Inuit across 
the Arctic to respect the wildlife management regime Ottawa was striving to 
impose.143 In February 1953, the Inuit of Coppermine (Kugluktuk, NWT) had 
petitioned Ottawa, asserting their rights regarding mineral resource extraction on 
their territory.144 Four years later, Inuit at Baker Lake had used an Eskimo council 
to directly challenge visiting federal officials on a range of policies, not the least 
being federal wildlife and hunter-management regimes.145 
As for the yaks, keeping the animals in the Ottawa area was doing nothing 
to determine whether they could in fact live in the Arctic.146 Officials were forced 
to re-examine the project’s purpose. In mid-1960, after determining that the yak 
no longer had “a significant place in the future plans of this administration,” the 
DNANR arranged to hand them over to a game farm in Alberta.147 
Lessons of the Yak: A Parallel History, An Entangled History
What is the significance of this curious episode? Two general observations may be 
made. First, despite the ultimately fruitless attempt to introduce yaks (notably yaks 
from India) into Ungava, what happened (or did not happen) in Ungava mattered. 
After all, one official described the DNANR effort as the “first and hesitant step 
towards the execution of much broader concepts, in the formulation of a policy 
140 LAC/NAP/97/251-3-19/1, Memorandum for Sivertz from Bolger, Sept. 29, 1958; LAC/NAP/428/251-3-
19/2, Letter to Symington from Carman, April 10, 1959; LAC/NAP/428/251-3-19/2, Letter to Cunningham 
from Wells, April 14, 1959; LAC/NAP/428/251-3-19/2, Memorandum for Director from Snowden, April 
19, 1960.
141 LAC/NAP/428, 251-3-19/2, Memorandum for Davidson from Symington, Jan. 5, 1960. 
142 LAC/NAP/428/251-3-19/2, Memorandum for Director from Snowden, April 19, 1960. Despite the 
program’s initial apparent success with the introduction of reindeer into the Mackenzie Valley in the 1930s, 
the herds had declined by the mid-1950s because of social and ecological factors, prompting Ottawa to sell 
them to private interests in 1960. Piper and Sandlos, “Broken Frontier,” p. 774. 
143 Kulchyski and Tester, Kiumajut (Talking Back), p. 95.
144 Cameron, Far Off Metal River, p. 102.
145 Kulchyski and Tester, Kiumajut (Talking Back), pp. 204-238. The council was the initiative of a northern 
service officer who, between postings in the Arctic, had spent time at the UN in New York alongside 
veterans of development work in India, Africa, and South America (p. 207).
146 LAC/NAP/428/251-3-19/2, Memorandum (unsent) to Steele from Robertson, May 2, 1960.
147 LAC/NAP/428/251-3-19/2, Memorandum for Cunningham from Sivertz, June 7, 1960; LAC/
NAP/428/251-3-19/2, Letter from Robertson to Secretary to the Treasury Board, Department of Finance, 
Dec. 14, 1960.
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for the use of renewable resources throughout the whole North.”148 This example 
of post-war northern development was of course in service to a settler society 
seeking to assert control over a territory as a precursor to resource extraction. In 
the years to follow, federal officials would continue attempting to redefine the 
relationship that the region’s Indigenous peoples had with their environment. 
Second, despite obvious differences between Canadian aid and Indian policy, the 
story reveals entanglements between what have usually been treated as discrete 
histories. Understanding the ‘Canadian’ contribution to the global history of 
development—and the impact of this transnational phenomenon in the Canadian 
context—requires an ongoing engagement with this entangled history. 
Exploring entanglements between the evolution of Canadian policy regarding 
Indigenous peoples and the Global South enriches our understanding of each by 
bringing a number of common themes into greater relief. Wherever they took 
place, Canadian development efforts were a manifestation of high modernism. 
As the Canadian state and society embraced a moderate Keynesianism, an 
increasingly activist federal government drew upon ‘expert’ knowledge to 
deliver technical assistance, aiming to achieve an allegedly more rational and 
effective socioeconomic order and thereby improve the lives of populations they 
targeted for development. Such efforts were grounded in modernization theory, 
a body of knowledge derived from centuries of imperial encounter and colonial 
development, ranging from the Indian subcontinent to the Arctic. As such, 
modernization theory privileged and reinforced Euro-Canadian predominance, 
along with the liberal-capitalist order that Ottawa sought to extend abroad and 
at home. It was no accident, after all, that parliamentarian James M. Macdonnell 
sought information from the DNANR as he prepared a speech in which he cited 
the department’s efforts in the Arctic in order to make the case for Canadian 
foreign aid, and especially its economic benefit to Canada.149 
Placing the history of Canada’s aid and Indian policies into conversation also 
reveals how race and the logic of white supremacy were manifested within and 
beyond Canada. Despite the sincerity of the liberal humanitarianism motivating 
technical assistance—to the contrary, because of this—Canada could not so easily 
escape the legacy of empire and the hierarchies of race and gender associated 
with it. One could argue that Canada had to champion and participate in technical 
assistance, whether through the UN, the Commonwealth, or other international 
organizations. For one thing, advocates such as Hugh Keenleyside depicted 
such efforts as being consistent with Canada’s own socioeconomic evolution; to 
deny technical assistance was to challenge the progress/development narrative 
of Canadian history. Even more significantly, to not jump on the technical-
assistance bandwagon and embrace the possibility of (and inherent value in) 
rapid socioeconomic change would have compelled Canada and Canadians to 
more directly confront difficult truths about the country’s treatment of Indigenous 
148 LAC/NAP/363/251-3-7/6, Memorandum for Symington from Larmour, Jan. 24, 1958.
149 LAC/NAP/1069/251-1/7, Memorandum for Sivertz from Robertson, Dec. 23, 1960. The speech appears in 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates of the House of Commons, Session 1960-1961, Volume 2 (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1961), pp. 1385-1388.
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peoples and the colonial dynamic in the northern half of North America. In short, 
it was far easier to project a nationalist-affirming paternalism abroad through 
a rapidly expanding aid effort, thereby leaving intact a nationalist-affirming 
paternalism at home toward the country’s Indigenous population as Ottawa 
asserted its dominion over the northern environment and its peoples.
The story of plans to transplant yaks from India to Ungava was a microcosm 
of these larger themes. Here was a classic case of high modernism: Canadian 
officials, building on earlier species transplantations, as well as understandings of 
human evolution and Indigenous peoples dating back to the nineteenth century, 
drew on mid-twentieth-century expert scientific and social scientific knowledge 
in an attempt to manipulate nature and thereby impose a settled life on the Inuit 
of Ungava as part of a much more ambitious policy of Arctic development—all 
in conjunction with and in service to a program of technical assistance targeting 
people in the Global South. The effort to harness yaks from India to the cause of 
northern development was grounded in a universalist logic—not just in terms of 
what was assumed to be the ‘normal’ form of human development and societal 
organization, but in terms of the attributes and benefits of citizenship in a liberal-
capitalist Canadian society giving primacy to the individual male bread-winner. 
Questions of race, gender, and the legacy of empire infused the DNANR’s plans to 
bring a territory and its population under the watchful and paternalistic dominion 
of the Canadian state. Race and empire were especially visible amid the suggestion 
that this could be achieved through the Colombo Plan, and subsequently, in the 
dissent of the departments of Agriculture and External Affairs. Despite enduring 
Indigenous agency, they were also apparent in the ignoring of Inuit voices and 
knowledge.
The rather sudden abandonment of the yak project in 1960 by no means 
meant the end of DNANR development efforts in the Arctic. To the contrary, 
the department dropped the scheme at a time of growing awareness—in Canada 
and elsewhere—of the disappointing results from post-1945 technical assistance 
and the need to rethink the field of development. Added to such doubts was a 
growing recognition that Canada’s ‘Indian problem’ remained acutely unresolved. 
In the decade that would follow, a growing Indigenous activism, including that 
of the Inuit, along with the Third World’s impact as a political and ideological 
force, would compel a fundamental rethinking of Canadian policy and attitudes 
regarding both development assistance and Indian affairs, ensuring that these 
two histories would continue to influence one another, as Canadian encounters 
with the Global South provoked fundamental questions regarding the nature of 
relations between Indigenous peoples and Canada.
